Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 Transmission Potential, Iran, 2020 by Muniz-Rodriguez, Kamalich et al.
Georgia Southern University 
Digital Commons@Georgia Southern 
Biostatistics, Epidemiology, and Environmental 
Health Sciences Faculty Publications 
Biostatistics, Epidemiology, and Environmental 
Health Sciences, Department of 
8-2020 
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 Transmission 
Potential, Iran, 2020 
Kamalich Muniz-Rodriguez 
Isaac Fung 
Shayesteh R. Ferdosi 
Sylvia Ofori 
Yiseul Lee 
See next page for additional authors 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.georgiasouthern.edu/bee-facpubs 
 Part of the Biostatistics Commons 
This article is brought to you for free and open access by the Biostatistics, Epidemiology, and Environmental Health 
Sciences, Department of at Digital Commons@Georgia Southern. It has been accepted for inclusion in 
Biostatistics, Epidemiology, and Environmental Health Sciences Faculty Publications by an authorized 
administrator of Digital Commons@Georgia Southern. For more information, please contact 
digitalcommons@georgiasouthern.edu. 
Authors 
Kamalich Muniz-Rodriguez, Isaac Fung, Shayesteh R. Ferdosi, Sylvia Ofori, Yiseul Lee, Amna Tariq, and 
Gerardo Chowell 
 Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 26, No. 8, August 2020 1915
RESEARCH LETTERS
To determine the transmission potential of severe acute 
respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 in Iran in 2020, we 
estimated the reproduction number as 4.4 (95% CI 3.9–
4.9) by using a generalized growth model and 3.5 (95% 
CI 1.3–8.1) by using epidemic doubling time. The repro-
duction number decreased to 1.55 after social distancing 
interventions were implemented.
1These first authors contributed equally to this article.
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Since early 2020, Iran has been experiencing a dev-astating epidemic of coronavirus disease (COV-
ID-19) (1). To determine the transmission potential 
of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 
2 and thereby guide outbreak response efforts, we 
calculated basic reproduction numbers (R0). Dur-
ing the early transmission phase, R0 quantifies the 
average number of secondary cases generated by a 
primary case in a completely susceptible population, 
absent interventions or behavioral changes. R0>1 
indicates the possibility of sustained transmission; 
R0<1 implies that transmission chains cannot sustain 
epidemic growth. As the epidemic continues, the ef-
fective reproduction number (Re) offers a time-de-
pendent record of the average number of secondary 
cases per case as the number of susceptible persons 
becomes depleted and control interventions take ef-
fect. We used 2 methods to quantify the reproduc-
tion number by using the curve of reported COV-
ID-19 cases in Iran and its 5 regions (Appendix Table 
1, https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/EID/article/26/8/20-
0536-App1.pdf). The Georgia Southern University 
Institutional Review Board made a non–human sub-
jects determination for this project (H20364), under 
the G8 exemption category.
For method 1, we used a generalized growth 
model (2) with the growth rate and its scaling factor 
to characterize the daily reported incidence. Next, 
we simulated the calibrated generalized growth 
model by using a discretized probability distribu-
tion of the serial interval and assuming a Poisson er-
ror structure (Appendix).
We based method 2 on calculation of the epi-
demic’s doubling times, which correspond to the 
times when the cumulative incidence doubles and are 
estimated by using the curve of cumulative daily re-
ported cases. To quantify parameter uncertainty, we 
used parametric bootstrapping with a Poisson error 
structure around the number of new reported cases to 
derive 95% CIs (3–5). Assuming exponential growth, 
the epidemic growth rate is equal to ln(2)/doubling 
time. Assuming that the preinfectious and infectious 
periods follow an exponential distribution, R0 ≈ (1 + 
growth rate × serial interval) (Appendix) (6).
For both methods, the serial interval was as-
sumed to follow a gamma distribution; mean (± 
SD) = 4.41 (± 3.17) days (7; C. You et al., unpub. 
data, https://www.medrxiv.org/content/10.1101
/2020.02.08.20021253v2). We used MATLAB ver-
sion R2019b (https://www.mathworks.com) and R 
version 3.6.2 (https://www.r-project.org) for data 
analyses and creating figures. We determined that 
a priori α = 0.05.
Using Wikipedia as a starting point, we double-
checked the daily reported new cases during Febru-
ary 19–March 19, 2020 (the day before the Iranian 
New Year) against official Iran press releases and 
other credible news sources and corrected the data 
according to official data (Appendix Tables 2, 3, Fig-
ure 1). Incident cases for the 5 regions were miss-
ing for 2 days (March 2–3), which we excluded from 
our analysis. Because the reported national number 
of new cases did not match the sum of new cases 
reported in Iran’s 5 regions on March 5, we treated 
each time series as independent and used the data 
as reported. Using method 1, we estimated R0 data 
for February 19–March 1, 2020. Using method 2, we 
estimated R0 from the early transmission phase (Feb-
ruary 19–March 1, 2020) and Re based on the growth 
rate estimated during March 6–19, 2020, when the 
epidemic slowed, probably reflecting the effect of 
social distancing.
Using method 1, we estimated an R0 of 4.4 (95% 
CI 3.9–4.9) for COVID-19 in Iran. We estimated a 
growth rate of 0.65 (95% CI 0.56–0.75) and a scaling 
parameter of 0.96 (95% CI 0.93–1.00) (Appendix Table 
4). The scaling parameter indicated near-exponential 
epidemic growth (Figure). Using method 2, we found 
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that during February 19–March 1, the cumulative 
incidence of confirmed cases in Iran had doubled 8 
times. The estimated epidemic doubling time was 
1.20 (95% CI 1.05–1.45) days, and the correspond-
ing R0 estimate was 3.50 (95% CI 1.28–8.14). During 
March 6–19, the cumulative incidence of confirmed 
cases doubled 1 time; doubling time was 5.46 (95% CI 
5.29–5.65) days. The corresponding Re estimate was 
1.55 (95% CI 1.06–2.57) (Appendix Table 5, Figures 7, 
8). Our results are robust and consistent with Iran’s 
COVID-19 R0 estimates of 4.7 (A. Ahmadi et al., un-
pub. data, https://www.medrxiv.org/content/10.11
01/2020.03.17.20037671v3) and 4.86 (E. Sahafizadeh, 
unpub. data, https://www.medrxiv.org/content/10
.1101/2020.03.20.20038422v2) but higher than the R0 
of 2.72 estimated by N. Ghaffarzadegan and H. Rah-
mandad (unpub. data, https://www.medrxiv.org/
content/10.1101/2020.03.22.20040956v1).
Our study has limitations. Our analysis is based on 
the number of daily reported cases, whereas it would 
be ideal to analyze case counts by dates of symptoms 
onset, which were not available. Case counts could 
be underreported because of underdiagnosis, given 
subclinical or asymptomatic cases or limited testing 
capacity to test persons with mild illness. The rapid 
increase in case counts might represent a belated re-
alization of epidemic severity and rapid catching up 
and testing many persons with suspected cases. If 
the reporting ratio remains constant over the study 
period, and given the near-exponential growth of the 
epidemic’s trajectory, our estimates would remain re-
liable. Although data are not stratified according to 
imported and local cases, we assumed that persons 
were infected locally because transmission has prob-
ably been ongoing in Iran for some time (8).
Although the COVID-19 epidemic in Iran has 
slowed substantially, the situation remains dire. 
Tighter social distancing interventions are needed to 
bring this epidemic under control.
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Figure. Estimates of transmission potential for severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 in Iran, 2020. A) Growth rate, r; B) 
scaling of the growth rate parameter, p; C) mean basic reproduction number, R0; and D) fit of the generalized growth model (method 1) 
to the Iran data, assuming Poisson error structure as of March 1, 2020. Dashed lines indicate 95% CIs.
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By April 30, 2020, South Korea had reported 10,765 cases of coronavirus disease (COVID-19) 
(1); ≈76.2% of cases were from Daegu and North 
Gyeongsang provinces. On February 25, a COVID-19 
case was detected in Cheonan, a city ≈200 km from 
Daegu. In response, public health and government 
officials from Cheonan and South Chungcheong 
Province activated the emergency response system. 
We began active surveillance and focused on iden-
tifying possible COVID-19 cases and contacts. We 
interviewed consecutive confirmed cases and found 
all had participated in a fitness dance class. We 
traced contacts back to a nationwide fitness dance 
instructor workshop that was held on February 15 
in Cheonan.
 Fitness dance classes set to Latin rhythms have 
gained popularity in South Korea because of the high 
aerobic intensity (2). At the February 15 workshop, 
instructors trained intensely for 4 hours. Among 27 
instructors who participated in the workshop, 8 had 
positive real-time reverse transcription PCR (RT-
PCR) results for severe acute respiratory syndrome 
coronavirus 2, which causes COVID-19; 6 were from 
Cheonan and 1 was from Daegu, which had the most 
reported COVID-19 cases in South Korea. All were as-
ymptomatic on the day of the workshop. 
By March 9, we identified 112 COVID-19 cases 
associated with fitness dance classes in 12 differ-
ent sports facilities in Cheonan (Figure). All cas-
es were confirmed by RT-PCR; 82 (73.2%) were 
symptomatic and 30 (26.8%) were asymptomatic 
at the time of laboratory confirmation. Instructors 
with very mild symptoms, such as coughs, taught 
classes for ≈1 week after attending the workshop 
During 24 days in Cheonan, South Korea, 112 persons 
were infected with severe acute respiratory syndrome 
coronavirus 2 associated with fitness dance classes at 
12 sports facilities. Intense physical exercise in densely 
populated sports facilities could increase risk for infec-
tion. Vigorous exercise in confined spaces should be 
minimized during outbreaks.
